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STUDENT COMMENTS
LANZA V. DREXEL & CO. AND RULE 106-5:
APPROACHING THE SCIENTER CONTROVERSY
IN PRIVATE ACTIONS
Federal regulation of securities transactions emerged from the
aftermath of the market 'crash of 1929' in the form of the federal
securities acts. 2 The basic purpose of these acts'is to provide inves-
tors with full disclosure of all material information and generally to
"insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets."' Under the
acts .a number of different provisions protect investors from losses
due to improper conduct in connection with the sale and purchase of
securities in interstate commerce. 4 Recently, however, investors
have come to rely heavily on a single provision of federal
laws—section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 6 and
Rule 10b-5 7 promulgated under its authority.s
One reason for this increasing reliance has been that the restric-
tive provisions regarding the statute of limitations and the measure
of damages of other sections of the securities laws make a suit under
101Y-5 preferable for many plaintiffs. 9 A second reason has been that
while Rule 10b-5 was originally viewed as an enforcement measure
for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)," and while the
I Note, Civil Liability Under Section 108 and Rule 106-5: A Suggestion for Replacing
the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658 (1965); Comment, 57 Geo. L,J. 1108 (1969).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 10(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b), 78r (1970).
5 Comment, supra note 1, at 1108.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors,
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
9 See D. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law 561 (1973).
I D See Comment, Remedies for Private Parties Under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 337 (1969).
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provisions of the rule do not specifically provide for a private cause
of action," the federal courts have implied a civil remedy for which
the injured investor may bring suit. 12
With the expanding use of 10b-5 as a basis for civil suits,
questions have emerged and still remain unanswered as to the scope
of liability under the rule. The most difficult and unsettled questions
concern the requirement of scienter." Lanza v. Drexel & Co."
represents a recent entry by the Second Circuit into the controversy
surrounding the state of mind necessary for the imposition of liabil-
ity on defendants under Rule 10b-5, that is, whether some form of
scienter is required or whether negligence is sufficient. Lanza is of
special significance because it represents the first case in which the
Second Circuit has been presented with the opportunity to impose a
standard of negligence on the specific facts of the case, rather than
by way of dictum, in a private cause of action. As prior cases are
examined it will become apparent that even where the court
appears to adopt a negligence standard it does so only in dictum,
since fraud, or at least scienter, is present in the facts. Notwith-
standing the court's apparent attempt to definitively resolve the
scienterrnegligence controversy and to clarify the scope of 10b-5, it
will be seen that Lanza falls short of achieving such a general
resolution of the problem.
The plaintiffs in Lanza, the sole owners of the Victor Billiard
Company (Victor), exchanged all of their Victor stock for 20,428
shares of the BarChris Construction Company (BarChris)." After
BarChris filed a petition in bankruptcy less than one year later,"
the plaintiffs commenced an action against the former officers and
directors of BarChris based, inter alia, on section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 10b-5." The district court" found that certain officers
' 1
 See 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law § 8.4(505), at 204.106 (1973).
12
 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (F.D. Pa. 1947), was the first case
to find civil liability under the rule, Since Kardon, a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5
has been upheld specifically or in dictum in every circuit except the Eighth Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit, where the question has apparently never been raised. See Nash
v. J. Arthur Warner & Ca., 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955) (First Circuit); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956); I3eury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954) (Fourth Circuit); Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co, v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir, 1962).
The Supreme Court has recently determined that a private right of action can be inferred
in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note II, § 8.4(501), at 204.101.
14
 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
15 Id. at 1280.
16 Id.
17
 Id.
is (1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11.92,826, at 90,089 (S.D.N. Y.
1970).
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and directors of BarChris had misled the plaintiffs through material
misstatements and omissions. l9 The court also found that defendant
Bertram D. Coleman, an independent director of BarChris, was not
liable to the plaintiffs. 20 Sitting en bane, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that Coleman in his
capacity as director and as a non-participant in the transaction owed
no duty to insure that all material adverse information was con-
veyed to the prospective purchasers of BarChris stock. 21
The purpose of this comment is to examine the Lanza decision,
but not as an isolated occurrence. The case will be analyzed as the
most recent in a long, arduous progression of cases which have
attempted to settle the controversy as to whether negligence or
scienter is the proper standard of conduct in a 10b-5 action. The
multitude of sometimes confusing and contradictory opinions of the
courts and commentators with regard to the scienter/negligence con-
troversy will be reviewed. Following this review, four underlying
causes of this controversy will be examined. Finally, an attempt will
be made to present a method of approaching and analyzing cases in
this area, and this method of approach will be applied in an analysis
of the Lanza opinion.
I. THE RULE 1 Ob-5 SCIENTER CONTROVERSY
In the entire scope of securities law, no issues are more "afire"
than those which surround Rule 10b-5. 22 An extensive debate has
raged in the courts and in the commentaries over the extent to which
the common law elements necessary for the proof of fraud 23 are
incorporated into section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For many of these
elements, the debate has been settled. Congress did not intend that
every false, misleading or omitted fact should give rise to a cause of
action; 24 rather the misstatement or omission must be with respect
to a material matter. 25 Reliance also appears to be an essential
19 Id. at 90,100.
2 ° Id. at 90,104.
21 479 F.2d at 1289.
22
 See Sommer, Rule 10b-5; Notes for Legislation, 17 [Case] W. Res. L. Rev. 1029
(1966).
23
 The five common law elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation (2) of a material
fact (3) made with knowledge (scienter) of the falsity for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff
to rely upon it and (4) upon which the plaintiff actually relied (5) to his detriment. W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
24
 See 78 Cong. Rec. 7707 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn); Kuhn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 279 (3d Cir. 1972).
25
 The Second Circuit defined materiality for the purpose of § 10(b) in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969):
As we stated in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462, "The basic test of
materiality .. . is whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact
misrepresented] .	 in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question
.	 .	 .
401 F.2d at 849 (emphasis in original).
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element of an action for damages under 10b-5. 26 In addition, the
plaintiff must have suffered some injury, and the defendant's mis-
conduct must have caused that injury. 27 Though the requirement
that the plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of securities has long been
attacked, such a relationship is still necessary for a 1013-5 cause of
action. 28 The federal courts, however, have relaxed the requirement
of privity between the plaintiff and defendant. 29
Following a general trend of "steady relaxation," the courts are
no longer preoccupied with the extent to which these elements are
required in a 10b-5 cause of action. 3° However, the question of
whether or not there should be a requirement of scienter in private
actions has never been settled 3 ,1 —"[t]hirty panel discussions,
seventy-five scholarly articles and uncounted cases later, the great
debate rages on."32
Historically three prominent positions have emerged in the
courts with respect to the scienter/negligence controversy. 33 The first
was enunciated in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co,, 34
which involved a suit for damages arising from a purchase of stock
where untrue representations were alleged to have been made in a
prospectus and registration statement. Here the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit laid down the rule that "proof of fraud is re-
quired in suits under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule X-10B-5,"35
The action of the defendant must be knowing and with an intent to
defraud; hence scienter is required. While federal courts within the
Second Circuit have followed Fischman in several cases, 36 only one
court37 outside of the circuit has done so. 38
26 See Mogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2c1 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). In Fashion Park, the
Second Circuit defined the test both objectively and subjectively: "Thus, to the requirement
that the individual plaintiff must have acted upon the fact misrepresented, is added the
parallel requirement that a reasonable man would also have acted upon the fact misrep-
resented." 340 F.2d at 462 (emphasis in original).
27
 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965). See also Note, supra note 1, at 661.
29 See, e.g., Birnibaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
29 See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins, Co. v, Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962);
Pettit v, American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
3° See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 11, § 8.4(502), at 204.102.
31 Ed .
32
 Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206 (1970).
33 See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 562, 564-67 (1972); Epstein,
The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under-Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 482, 484-88 (1970).
34
 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
•	 15
 Id. at 786.
36 E.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y, 1967); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F.
Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 324-25
(S. D. N. Y. 1965).
32 See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Coio. 1964). The
precedential value of Trussell, however, is questionable. In Stevens v. Vowel!, 343 F.2d 374,
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The second position is that taken by the Ninth Circuit in Ellis
v. Carter. J 9 Ellis involved an action for damages resulting from the
defendants' misrepresentation that if the plaintiff would purchase
shares of the corporation at a price in excess of the market price, he
would gain a voice in the corporate management. The Ellis court
rejected the contention that the plaintiff, in an action under Rule
10b-5, "must allege and ultimately prove genuine fraud, as distinct -
from 'a mere misstatement or omission' . . ."40 It is difficult to see
how this language requires any fault whatsoever on the part of the
defendant." Indeed it has been suggested that the Ellis case is
authority that Rule 10b-5 prohibits not only negligent conduct, but
also purely innocent misrepresentations 42—although no court has
actually gone to this extreme.' While several courts have indicated
support for the Ellis position by way of dictum," only one district
court can be said to have actually based its decision on Ellis."
The third position is that of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co." In Texas Gulf Sulphur a misleading press release
concerning a discovery of mineral deposits was coupled with inten- ,
sive insider trading. The SEC brought an action to enjoin the
corporation and the individual defendants from continuing such
activity. The Second Circuit held that an injunction under Rule
10b-5 could be based on mere negligence in the issuance of a
corporate press release, stating that "lack of diligence, constructive
fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct" would fulfill the re-
quirement of the rule. 47 An injunction could ensue if "the misleading
statement resulted from a lack of due diligence . . . . ),48
While Texas Gulf Sulphur has been much cited in subsequent
cases and much discussed in the commentaries, it has provided no
real answer to the scienter/negligence controversy with respect to
379 (10th Cir. 1965), the court of appeals stated: "It is not necessary to allege or prove
common law fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule." Then in Parker v.
Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D. Colo. 1965), the Colorado district
court found this to be dictum and reaffirmed Trussell.
36 See Epstein, supra note 33, at 485.
39
 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
46
 Id. at 274. In accepting the contention that fraud is not necessary under 10b-5 the
Ellis court purported to reaffirm Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960);
however, in Matheson there was a finding of intentional fraud. Id. at 672.
Al See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1071 (3d ed. 1972).
42
 Epstein, supra note 33, at 486.
43
 Id. Language is some cases, however, seems to support such a holding. See, e.g.,
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
" Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Stevens v. Vowel', 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
43
 Hendricks v. Flato Realty Invs., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 92,290, at 97,388 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
46
 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
42 401 F.2d at 855.
48
 Id. at 863.
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private actions. In Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 49 one of the
opinions which followed in the wake of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., the court found "the great debate over ordinary negligence
vs. scienter in private actions" unresolved." In sum, the case
law arising under Rule 10b-S, at least with regard to the
scienter/negligence issue, appears to be in a "chaotic mess," 51 with
no clear trend emerging. 52
The commentators are in no more agreement than the courts on
the scienter issue; 53 they are divided on what the law is and on what
it should be. 54 Finding no solace in the opinions of the courts, the
scholarly writings or the rule itself, one commentator has decided
that the lob-5 scienter issue represents a question of policy that the
SEC is best equipped to handle. 55
Short of dramatic legislative' or administrative intervention,
however, the courts will continue to define the scope of liability
under Rule lob-5 on a case-by-case basis. It is therefore important
to identify the sources of the confusion and unfortunate lack of
consistency that envelop the lob-5 scienter question. It is submitted
that there are four underlying causes of this confusion: the nature of
the federal court system, the breadth of Rule 10b-5, the lack of
congressional guidance and the approach which the courts have
adopted in their opinions.
A. The Federal Court System
Stare decisis operates within, but not between, each of the
eleven judicial circuits which comprise the federal court system. 56
As a result the Ninth Circuit in Ellis could find negligence sufficient
to impose liability under 10b-5, even though the Second Circuit in
Fischman found an intent to defraud necessary. Since the United
" 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
50 Id. at 1343-44.
51 Hamilton, Book Review, 46 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1968).
52 Sec Epstein, supra note 33, at 489.
53 Numerous possible standards of conduct under Rule 10b-5 have been discussed by the
commentators. See, e.g., Note, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1070, 1074 (1965) (would require scienter);
Jennings, Insider Tradings in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure
Obligations Under Rule 106-5, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 809, 818 (1968) (would require scienter
except that if the plaintiff and defendant are in a fiduciary-type relationship, negligence would
be sufficient); Comment, Securities Regulation: Shareholder Derivative Actions Against Insid-
ers Under Rule 106-5, 1966 Duke L.J. 166, 171-72 (would require at least "watered down"
scienter); Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621
(1966) (same); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev.
824, 844 (1965) (would extend liability to include negligent misrepresentations); Israels, Book
Review, 77 Yale L.J. 1585, 1593 (1.968) (same); 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 11, § 8.4(513)
(recommends a flexible transactional approach); Mann, supra note 32 (same); Ruder, Texas
Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale
Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 444-45 n.107 (1968) (same); Comment, 57 Geo. L.J. 1108,
1115-17 (1969) (same). ,
5° See Epstein, supra note 33, at 489.
55 Id. at 504.
56 See 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice 11 0.402(1), at 61 (2d ed. 1965).
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States Supreme Court has thus far not resolved the controversy, an
unfortunate lack of consistency persists among the circuits.
B. The Breadth of Rule 10b-5
A second major factor contributing to the confusion has been
the breadth of Rule 10b-5. 57 The essence of the rule is that anyone
who
trading for his own account in the securities of a corpora-
tion has "access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take "advan-
tage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public."
Thus, 10b-5 encompasses an "extraordinary variety" of persons
and situations. 59
 From the aspect of potential defendants, Rule
10b-5 covers any insider. 6° As the Texas Gulf Sulphur court
noted, this includes "anyone in possession of material inside infor-
mation . . ."61
 Thus, corporate directors and officers, 62 geologists
and electrical engineers, 63 accounting firms 64 and numerous others
have become 10b-.5 defendants. There is also an extremely broad
pool of potential plaintiffs under the rule. Plaintiffs have ranged
from the former director and secretary of the defendant
corporation 65
 to simple speculators in securities."
Rule 10b-5 also covers a broad spectrum of transactions that
range from the direct or personal (e.g., face-to-face exchanges) to the
indirect or impersonal (e.g., general market trading). 67 The rule also
encompasses a number of different relationships between the parties
(e.g., fiduciary-beneficiary, broker-customer)."
Another aspect of the breadth of Rule 10b-5 is that not only
SEC suits, but also private civil actions come within the scope of the
rule. 69
 Many courts have taken the position that the requirements of
57
 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 11, § 8.4(507).
55
 Texas GurSulphur, 401 F.2d at 848, quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 912 (1961).
59
 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 11, § 8.4(507).
60 See note 7 supra.
8 ! 401 F.2d at 848.
67
 E.g., defendants Stephens (president) and Fogarty (executive vice-president) in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); defendant Coleman (director) in Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
63
 E.g., defendants Darke (geologist) and Clayton (electrical engineer) in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
" E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. in Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp.
94 (N.D. III. 1967).
65
 E.g., Kohler (director and secretary) in Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963).
66
 See, e.g., Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
67
 See 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law § 8.4(513), at 204.115 (1973).
68 See id.
69 See note 12 supra.
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proof and the elements of an SEC-initiated action should be less
stringent than those in a cause of action for damages brought by a
private individual." As the United States Supreme Court pointed
out in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,'" the elements
of a cause of action for fraud vary "with the nature of the relief
sought," and "Olt is not necessary in a suit for equitable relief or
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages."72
A final factor which contributes to the rule's breadth is that
10b-5 prohibits not only material misstatements,. but also material
omissions. 73
C. Lack of Congressional Guidance
Congress did not specifically provide for a private cause of
action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and therefore the language of this section and of Rule 10b-5 does not
specify the elements of such an action. 74 Moreover, since 10(b) was
one of the least controversial sections of the 1934 Act, there is a
dearth of congressional debate and comment on this provision, 75 As
a result, the legislative history of section 10(b) offers no real gui-
dance as to the standard to be employed under the rule. 76
D. The Approach of the Courts
The federal courts themselves have contributed in a number of
ways to the confusion as to the appropriate standard in a 10b-5
action, and the Second Circuit's decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur
furnishes a clear example of several sources of confusion. First, the
use of dictum in numerous opinions has caused confusion as to the
specific holding of the court. The Texas Gulf Sulphur majority found
that the "common law standard of deceptive conduct has been
modified in the interests of a broader protection for the investing
public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.""
7° See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967),
71 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
72
 Id. at 193.
73 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457; 462 (2d Cir. 1965). See also A.
Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.2, at 197.
74
 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.4(505), at 204.106.
" I. A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 2.2(331), at 22.2-.3 states:
Of nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined references to
§ 10(b) . . . would scarcely fill a page. Much the same is true in the Senate. "
The several Committee Reports merely paraphrase the language of the several
Bills and add little or nothing to the evidence on intent . . 	 .
The floor debates are no more enlightening.
76 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.4(505), at 204.106.
The administrative history of Rule 10b-5 has proved no more enlightening. See Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc:, 458 F.2d 255, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1972). The administrative history
of 106-5 was also examined by the Lanza court. See 479 F.2d at 1290, 1299.
77 401 F.2d at 854-55.
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However, Judge Friendly, who concurred on the facts of the case,
noted that the imposition of liability on the defendants did not
require such a metamorphosis of Fischman v. Raytheon Manufac-
turing Co.," which had required fraud for 10b-5 liability, because
the defendants had knowledge equivalent to scienter. 79 Thus, it was
unnecessary for the majority to discuss negligence in light of the
defendants' conduct, and the court's approval of a negligence stan-
dard was dictum. 8 ° Indeed, no defendant has yet been held liable
for negligent conduct on the specific facts of the case in a private
cause of action under 10b-5; 81 the courts that have accepted the
negligence standard have done so in dictum.
The confusion concerning the scienter/negligence issue has also
been increased by the fact that the courts have employed various
'definitions of scienter, which have at times been imprecise and
contradictory. 82
 Scienter has been variously defined to include ac-
tual knowledge, knowing falsity, intent, various gradations of reck-
lessness, and even what is virtually negligence, or even innocerke. 83
As a result, there is simply no assurance that judges using the same
word mean the same thing. 84 Negligence has fared no better. 85 The
opinion of the majority in Texas Gulf Sulphur provides an example
of this semantic confusion. The court stated that " 'some form of
the traditional scienter requirement,' . . . sometimes defined as
'fraud,' . . . is preserved. This requirement, whether it be termed
lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable . or negligent
conduct, remains implicit in the standard . . . ." 86 The various terms
employed by the court are simply not interchangeable with each
other. 87
Finally, the federal courts have contributed to the confusion by
attempting to impose a single standard of conduct (either negligence
or some form of scienter) under a very broad rule which encompas-
ses different types of parties and different types of actions. Differing
kinds of relief are sought under the rule for different conduct (mis-
statements and nondisclosure). In fact, each case involves different
facts which do not lend themselves to "sweeping statements" regard-
ing the elements required for the imposition of liability under Rule
10b-5. 88
 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, Judge Friendly was careful to -
78
 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
79
 401 F.2d at 868 n.4 (concurring opinion).
'° See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 562, 578
-(1972).
" Id. at 570.
82
 See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.4(503), at 204.102.
L See id. § 8.4(501), at 204.101; 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1432 (2d ed. 1961);
Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 482, 483
(1970).
84
 See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.4(503), at 204.103.
85
 See Bucklo, supra note 80, at 564, 567.
86
 401 F.2d at 855, quoting Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added by court).
87
 Bucklo, supra note 80, at 567.
88
 Ruder, supra nnte 53, at 450.
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distinguish an SEC action for injunctive relief from a private action
for damages, and his concurring opinion confined the language of
the court to the former. 89
As a result of the use of dictum, inconsistent terminology and
an ostensible attempt to impose a single standard, Texas Gulf Sul-
phur, clearly a landmark case in this area of the law, has left an
"unfortunate legacy of uncertainty" concerning the requirement of
scienter in lob-5 actions. 9°
II. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO 10b-5 CASES
Several observations should be made concerning the underlying
causes of the confusion over the scienter/negligence issue. First, in
each case where the courts have found negligence sufficient for the
imposition of liability under Rule 10b-5 1 scienter has actually
existed. 9 ' Thus, the language employed by the courts must be
analyzed critically in light of the particular facts of each case to
determine the rationale underlying the court's decision. 92 Next, the
use of "catch phrases and categories" has avoided rather than pro-
moted a resolution of the scienter/negligence controversy. 93 Much of
the confusion could be quieted if more concern was shown for the
meaning of the terms utilized by the courts." Finally, given the
enormous diversity of 10b-5, perhaps no single standard of conduct
is sufficient in all facets of the application Of the rule" and there is a
real need for flexibility. 96 As the Supreme Court noted in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.," the determination of liabil-
ity has varied "with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship
between the parties, and the merchandise in issue." 98 Underneath
the language of the opinions perhaps this is the approach which the
courts have taken all along—feigning consistent standards, while in
fact deciding each case on the basis of its individual facts. 99
It is submitted that the following method of approaching the
cases in this area accomplishes these objectives and avoids the
confusion which has hindered efforts to determine a standard, or
standards, of conduct in 10b-5 actions. The method which is sug-
gested herein for approaching 10b
-5 cases, and which will be em-
99 401 F.2d at 868 (concurring opinion).
99 Comment, 57 Geo. L.J. 1108, 1117 (1969).
91 See, e.g., SEC v, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961). See also Bucklo, supra note 80, at 570,
92 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir. 1972).
93 Mann, Rule 106-5; Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N. Y.U.L. Rev. 1206, 1206.07 (1970).
94
 Bucklo, supra note 80, at 567.
95 Mann, supra note 93, at 1220.
96 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 67, § 8.4(513), at 204.115.
97 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
9" Id. at 193.
99 Mann, supra note 93, at 1207.
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ployed in analyzing the Lanza decision, is comprised of four steps:
(a) determining the facts of the case, (b) analyzing the court's treat-
ment of those facts, (c) analyzing the law upon which the court has
based its decision, and (d) considering the public policy arguments
which the court employs. It is not to be inferred that this method
represents a startling new departure, but rather a rigorous applica-
tion of legal method principles, from which many courts have
strayed in analyzing 10b-5 cases.
A. Determining the Facts of the Case
The first step in analyzing a lOb-5 case, indeed any case, is the
determination of the facts of the case with specificity. It has been
suggested that with each particular case "remembering what is not
involved is as important as determining what is." 100 Since stare
decisis does not bind the courts in one circuit to the decisions of
another,un the circuit in which the case has been decided should be
noted. Next, a ;distinction should be made between SEC and private
actions, 1 °2
 after which the specific facts of the particular case need
to be isolated. Who is the defendant and what is his relationship to
the corporation whose stocks are being traded? Is he a director or an
officer, or is he in the lower echelons of management? Perhaps he is
a stockbroker, or someone else outside the corporation. The plaintiff
must then be identified with similar specificity. Next, the relation-
ship between the parties (fiduciary-beneficiary, broker-customer,
etc.) and the nature of the transaction (direct or indirect, personal or
impersonal) must be determined. Finally, has there been a mis-
statement or an omission of a material fact?
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,' 03 decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en bane, involved a
private cause of action for damages.'°4
 The plaintiffs, Frank Lanza,
Jr., Marie Lanza Sharbo, and Clare Lanza Stefano, were the sole
owners of the Victor Billiard Company (Victor), a closely-held fam-
ily corporation. On December 14, 1961 they exchanged all of the
stock of Victor for 20,428 shares of the BarChris Construction
Company (BarChris)." 5
 Less than one year later, BarChris filed a
'°° SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
1°1
 See 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice 11 0.402(1), at 61 (2d ed. 1965).
102
 As has already been pointed out, the elements required for private as opposed to SEC
actions are not necessarily the same. See text at notes 69-72, 88-89 supra.
1 ° 3
 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) {en bane).
104 On Sept. 16, 1971, a panel composed of Judges Moore, Smith and Hays heard oral
argument on this appeal. Before an opinion was filed, the court of appeals ordered sua sponte
that the appeal be argued before the court en bane. Id. at 1279-80.
1 °5
 Id. at 1280. BarChris was also involved in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N. Y. 1968). In Escott, BarChris raised needed working capital from the sale
of debentures. Drexel & Co., a Philadelphia brokerage and investment banking firm, was the
principal underwriter of the debenture offering. Bertram Coleman, a partner in Drexel, joined
the BarChris board of directors in connection with this transaction in April 1961. The action
against BarChris in Escott was based on § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. * 77k
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petition in bankruptcy)" After an unsuccessful effort to recover
their shares, 107
 the plaintiffs borrowed $100,000 to pay the trustee in
bankruptcy for the return of their Victor stock.'" The plaintiffs
thereupon commenced an action for compensatory and punitive
damages against the former officers and directors of BarChris.'"
Their suit was based, inter alia, on section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-S." 0
The district courts" found that the plaintiffs, through their
accountant and representative Sidney Shulman," 2
 had been led by
the material misstatements and omissions of certain officers and
directors of BarChris to exchange their Victor shares for BarChris
shares." 3
 The court also found that defendant Bertram D. Cole-
man, who represented the interests of Drexel as an independent
director on the BarChris board, " 4
 was not liable to the plaintiffs." 5
With respect to Coleman, the district court held that he did not
participate in or know of any deception practiced upon the plain-
tiffs, and that under these circumstances, he was under no duty to
investigate more than he did or to seek out and advise the plaintiffsin
 any way.' 16
The plaintiffs' appealed the decision of the district court ex-
onerating Coleman.' 17
 The majority of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit viewed the issue presented as:
(1970), which permits any person who has acquired a security issued under a registration
statement with a material misstatement or omission of a required statement to sue "every
person who signed the registration statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1) (1970). Since Coleman
had signed the BarChris registration statement, which was found to be misleading, he was
held liable.
106
 479 F.2d at 1280.
1 °7
 Plaintiffs brought a recission action against the trustee in bankruptcy appointed for
BarChris. Id,
166
 Id.
1 °9 Id. Defendants included Christie Vitolo, president of BarChris; Leonard Russo,
director and vice-president; Theodore Kircher, director and treasurer; Leborio Pugliese,
vice-president; John Ames Ballard, director; Bertram D. Coleman, director; and the firm of
which Coleman was a partner, Drexel & Co. Id.
110
 Id. The plaintiffs' action was also based on § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. 77q(a) (1970), common law fraud, and a theory of prima facie tort. Id.
111
 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1
92,826, at 90,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1'2 Because the plaintiffs had "modest academic training" and were not knowledgeable
in finance, accounting or securities, they relied upon their accountant of many years, Sidney
Shulman, throughout the negotiations. His role in the transaction was plain to all concerned
on both sides of the deal. 479 F.2d at 1283.
113
 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 90,100. Defendants Vitolo,
Russo and Kircher were held liable to plaintiffs under Rule 106-5 and under common law
fraud. Id. at 90,101. Vitolo and Russo were also held liable under § 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). Id. at 90, 102-03.
114
 Drexel wanted one of its partners in a position to oversee the activities of a company
in which it was going to make a large investment. 479 F.2d at 1311.
112
 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 90,104.
"6 Id.
17
 479 F,2d at 1280. Defendant Kircher appealed the district court's denial of his
demand for a trial by jury, However, Kircher's appeal was not submitted to the en bane
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What duty, if any, does Rule 10b-5 impose upon a director
in Coleman's position to insure that all material, adverse
information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the
corporation's stock where the director does not know that
these prospective purchasers are not receiving all such
information?'"
In its opinion, the Lanza majority asserted that it was mindful
that generalizations were major hazards in Rule 1013-5 cases and
therefore "set out in detail" the evidence regarding Coleman's know-
ledge of, and participation in, the negotiations which lead to the
Victor-BarChris exchange. 19 The negotiations for the exchange
began in March 1961, and the closing took place on December 14 of
the same year. During that period of time a number of meetings
took place between certain officers and directors of BarChris and
Shulman, the Lanzas' accountant.'" Coleman was not present at
these meetings, nor was he even aware of their existence or
purpose. 12 ' He was never advisdd of the substance of the
negotiations, 122
 nor of what information had been given to the
plaintiffs. 123 Indeed, it was not until after the closing that he had
any knowledge or belief that BarChris had published any false or
misleading figures.' 24 Coleman was not aware, or even suspicious,
that the Lanzas were being deceived during the negotiations, 125 and
he himself never communicated anything to the plaintiffs or their
accountant.' 26
On November 6, 1961, the BarChris board approved the Victor
exchange. Coleman was not present at this meeting, 127 however,
court. Defendants Vitolo and Pugliese reached a settlement with the plaintiffs. Defendant
Russo's appeal was dismissed by the court as untimely. The plaintiffs did not argue before the
en banc court that the dismissal of their complaint as to defendant Ballard was erroneous. See
id. at 1280-81 & n.4.
The en banc court carefully noted that its sole concern was with Coleman's responsibility
(if any) for the fraud perpetrated by the other officers and directors, and not with whether
such a fraud was in fact perpetrated. Id. at 1281.
1 ' 8 Id. at 1289. Judge Hays, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the issue somewhat
differently:
The question presented to this, en banc court is whether the director of a
corporation should be liable to the purchasers of that corporation's shares when he
fails to make any inquiry about the actions of his co-directors and the Company's
officers with respect to the representations made in connection with the sale of stock.
Id. at 1317 (dissenting opinion).
114 Id. at 1281.
12°
 Id, at 1283-84.
' 2 ' Id.
122 Id. at 1284.
123 Id. at 1286.
124 Id. at 1288.
125 Id. Indeed, Coleman was of the opinion that the price that BarChris was paying for
the Victor stock was too high. Id. at 1286.
126 Id. at 1284.
122 Id,
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and it was not until approximately November 13, when he received
the minutes of this meeting, that he first learned of the Victor
acquisition. 12" The only connection which Coleman had with the
entire transaction was that he attended the November 21 meeting of
the BarChris board of directors, at which the finalized acquisition
contract was approved.' 29
 When the closing took place on De-
cember 14, Coleman did not attend. 13 °
On the basis of its detailed examination of these facts, the
Lanza court concluded that a director, who did not participate in the
transaction is not under a duty to insure that all material adverse
information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the
corporation on whose board he sits. 13 '
B. Court's Treatment of the Facts
After a detailed determination of the facts of the case, the
second step in the suggested method of approach to 10b-5 cases
involves recognition of the treatment'which the court gives to these
facts. The court may consider the position and expertise of the
parties and the relationship between them to be important. Both the
common law and securities laws have long established a special duty
of care for persons closely associated with an issuing corporation and
for professionals in the securities business when they are dealing in a
fiduciary capacity with their customers. i 32
 It has been suggested
that while scienter should ordinarily be required, negligence should
be the standard of conduct when a fiduciary relationship exists
between the parties.' 33
 Therefore, a f0b-5 defendant may be held to
a higher standard when he has a fiduciary obligation to the
plaintiff. 134
 As a corollary, the defendant may be held to a lower
standard of conduct as the plaintiffs sophistication and ability to
protect his own interests increases.' 35
In weighing the facts which may affect the standard of conduct,
the court may also consider the economic self-interest of the parties
24 Id .
129
 Id. Thus, when Coleman first became aware of the Victor-BarChris transaction, it
had already been completed and approved by the board. It had been negotiated without any
participation on Coleman's part or knowledge as to any 'representations or omissions of
material facts made by the officers of BarChris. Id.
13° Id.
131
 Id. at 1289.
132
 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v, Paine,-Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,748, at 99,276 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Mann, Rule 10h-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206, 1210 (1970).
133
 Jennings, Insider Tradings in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Dis-
closure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. 	 Rev. 809, 818 (1968).
134
 Cf. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.; 228 F. Supp. 757, 774 (D. Colo. 1964).
See also Mann, supra note 132, at 1214-15.
135 See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963); Mann, supra note
132, at 1214-15.
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to the transaction. 136 Where the management and board of directors
of a corporation are acting in their own self-interest or for a control-
ling third party, the buyer or seller of the corporation's stock is
helpless unless he knows of the conflict of interest and has access to
sufficient facts to make a valid judgment: 37 Therefore, in self-
dealing transactions, it does not appear unreasonable that the courts
may react by being more inclined toward negligence as the proper
standard of actionable conduct: 38
The court may also consider the nature of the transaction and.
the degree to which the parties have participated. Those persons
who actively participate in or initiate the transaction may be_ held to
a higher standard than those who do not. 13 °
Finally, the decision of the court may be influenced by the
number of plaintiffs and the question of damages. The result in a
case involving a relatively small number of plaintiffs may well be
quite different from that in an action brought on behalf of numerous
purchasers or sellers: 40 The amount of damages in the former
situation is relatively finite. On the other hand, damages in the latter
situation might well be millions of dollars: 41 When faced with such
enormous potential payments, the brunt of which would be borne by
the innocent shareholders of the defendant corporation, the courts
may proceed more slowly. 142
In weighing the factual situation of the case, the majority in
Lanza v. Drexel & Co. considered and emphasized four major facts:
(1) the nature of the cause of action, (2) Coleman's position, (3)
Coleman's lack of participation in the transaction, and (4) his lack of
knowledge. Other facts which could have been taken into account,
such as the expertise of the parties, their relationship and their
economic self-interest, were never really considered by the court. It
appears that Coleman's complete lack of contact with the plaintiffs
and his complete lack of awareness of the deception were conclusive
in the opinion.of the court.
The majority was very careful to point out that Lanza involved
a private cause of action, noting early in the opinion that the action
involved was one for compensatory and punitive damages: 43 This
stress was apparently placed upon the nature of the cause of action
because the plaintiffs were urging the imposition of liability on
Coleman for negligence, relying heavily on Texas Gulf Sulphur as
precedent: 44 By stressing that Lanza involved a private cause of
See ChasMs v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970); Mann,
supra note 132, at 1210.
137 See, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 287 (3d Cir. 1972).
'" Id.	 n
139 Mann, supra note 132, at 1219.
"" See Kohn, 458 F.2d at 286.
141 Id.
142 Id .
143 479 F.2d at 1280.
144 Id. at 1304.
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action, the majority was able successfully to distinguish Texas Gulf
Sulphur on the ground that the latter case did not involve a private
cause of action, but was an SEC enforcement suit for injunctive
relief. ' 45
Secondly, the Lanza court placed great emphasis on Coleman's
position. In setting out the facts of the case the court described in
detail the nature of Coleman's relationship with BarChris. He was
an independent director, placed on the BarChris board as a rep-
resentative of Drexel & Co. to protect Drexei's financial interest by
overseeing the activities of BarChris. 146 The court stressed that, as a
director, Coleman's role was to supervise the performance of
management. 147 The majority observed that corporate directors are
not involved in the day-to-day conduct of the company's affairs.'"
It reasoned that since an important aspect of the supervisory role of
a director is trust in the integrity and competence of management,'"
the imposition of liability on directors in a fact situation such as that
in Lanza would make them insurers of all corporate activities.'" As
a result, they would be forced to personally verify all that the
corporate officers had done.'"
Thus, Coleman's position as an independent director of Bar-
Chris was important to the decision of the court. Yet, on this critical
point, the court appeared to be inviting confusion. Coleman was an
independent or outside director,  a director who is not a full-
time employee of the corporation. 152
i.e. ,
owever, the court throughout
its opinion alternately referred to Coleman as an independent direc-
tor and as a director. In setting forth its conclusion, for example, the
court referred to Coleman as a director. 153 As a result, the court left
some doubt as to whether it was treating Coleman as a director
—and therefore speaking of all directors—or whether it was refer-
ring only to independent directors. Three factors seem to indicate
that the court was addressing itself .to independent directors: first,
Coleman was in fact an independent director, and to extend the
holding of Lanza to all directors would go beyond the facts of the
case; second, the court used the fact that Coleman was an indepen-
dent director to support its conclusion with respect to Coleman's
knovvledge;" 4 and finally, the court used the value of independent
directors as a policy argument to support its decision. 155
145 Id.
146 Id, at 1282.
347
 Id. at 1306.
1414 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1281, 1302.
'Si Id. at 1307.
152 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L.J. 1078, 1092 (1968).
153 479 F.2d at 1289, 1309.
154 See text at note 165 infra.
155 479 F.2d at 1306-07.
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A further fact emphasized by the Lanza majority in weighing
the facts of the case was Coleman's lack of participation in the
negotiations leading up to the Victor-BarChris transaction and in
the transaction itself. At the beginning of its opinion, the court set
out "in detail" the evidence regarding Coleman's lack of
participation, 1 S 8 and stressed this fact throughout. Coleman did not
participate in the negotiations, nor did he communicate any infor-
mation to the Lanzas or contact them in any way. Because the
transaction had been approved at a prior board meeting at which he
was not present, the only contact Coleman had with the entire
transaction was his presence at the board meeting when the final
contract was approved. 157
Inseparably linked to Coleman's lack of participation was his
lack of knowledge. Here again, the court set out this evidence "in
detail" and stressed the fact throughout the opinion. 158 Not only did
Coleman not participate in the deception, but he was completely
unaware that the plaintiffs had been deceived.' 59 The importance
placed on this lack of participation' and knowledge on Coleman's
part is evidenced by the following statement of the court:
We recognize that participation by a director in the
dissemination of false information reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public may subject such a director
to liability under the Rule. But it is quite a different matter
to hold a director liable in damages for failing to insure
that all material, adverse information is conveyed to pro-
spective purchasers of the company's stock absent substan-
tial participation in the concealment or knowledge of it.
Absent knowledge or substantial participation we have
refused to impose such affirmative duties of disclosure.
upon Rule lob-5 defendants. 168
While these words substantiate the importance which 'the court
placed on Coleman's lack of participation and knowledge, they also
raise several questions. First, was it really critical to the decision of
the court that Coleman was an independent director, or even a
director at all? The opinion could be read as saying that no one
—regardless of his position in the corporation—will be held liable
where he lacks knowledge and has not participated in the transac-
tion. It appears that knowledgeable participation by a director
would expose him to liability. Is participation in the transaction
sufficient without knowledge of the deception? Conversely, is know-
ledge without participation sufficient? Given what the court said
about independent directors, do -the same standards apply to
156 Id. at 1281, 1283-84.
157
 Id. at 1283-84.
I" Id. at 1281, 1284-88.
154 Id. at 1288.
16° Id. at 1302 (emphasis in original).
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officers? These are questions which can best be answered after
variations on the instant facts have been presented to the courts.
However, it cannot be overlooked that participation and knowledge
are two facts which the Lanza court considered to be central.
The majority also focused on another aspect of Coleman's
knowledge—his awareness of the financial condition of BarChris.
Coleman was apparently aware of many disquieting facts about
BarChris. 161 It was argued by the plaintiffs that it was inexcusable
for Coleman not to have inquired as to whether or not the financial
status of BarChris had been fully and accurately disclosed to the
prospective buyers, and it was suggested that if Coleman had in-
quired, he would have discovered the fraud.' 62 Relying on Texas
Gulf Sulphur, Judge Hays' dissent in Lanza urged that liability
should be imposed upon Coleman for his negligent failure to dis-
cover that misrepresentations had been made by the BarChris
.officers. 163 The majority, however, disagreed, holding that "a will-
ful or reckless disregard for the truth" is necessary to establish
liability.'" In finding that Coleman did not show such a reckless
disregard for the truth, the court stated that Coleman, "displaying
an attitude not ordinarily found in outside directors, ... played an
active and concerned role in BarChris's affairs." 165
In sum, after considering the facts which the court in Lanza
emphasized and considered important, the holding of the case,
limited to its facts, is that in a private action under Rule 10b-5, an
independent director of the issuing corporation will not be held
liable to the purchasers of the corporation's stock when he neither
participates in nor knows of the deceit.
C. Consideration of the Law Upon Which the Court
Bases Its Decision
The third step in approaching Rule 10b-5 cases involves analyz-
ing the law upon which the particular court has based its decision.
In 10b-5 cases, the courts have relied on (1) the language of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the intent of Congress and the SEC in
adopting and promulgating these provisions; and (2) case law prece-
dent.
An analysis of the rationale of a court concerning the language
of, and legislative history behind, section 10(b) is fraught with
difficulty. As noted above,'" because a private cause of action was
not expressly provided for in section 10(b),' 67 and because of a
161 Id. at 1304.
' 62 Id.
163 H. at 1319 (dissenting opinion).
164 Id. at 1306.
165 Id.
166 See text at note 74 supra.
162
 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law § 8.4(505), at 204.106 (1973).
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dearth of congressional guidance,'" a court can only infer the scope
of coverage of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 169 It is therefore not
possible to do more than to analyze the inference's which a court has
drawn. Solid arguments have been marshalled to support two major
interpretations of the scope of section 10(b): (1) that the legislation is
to be interpreted as remedial, expansive, and not confined to com-
mon law boundaries extant before 1933; 170 and (2) that the legisla-
tion was passed against the background of the common law, and
was, for all intents and purposes, a codification of that law."'
Neither view can really be proved correct or incorrect.
If the court finds that its decision is warranted by the case law,
the accuracy of the court's perception of the .cases upon which it
relies must be scrutinized. Has the court used decisions from other
circuits which are contrary to the case law development in its own
circuit? Does the court adopt the language of a prior court without
the meaning which the prior court attached to it? Most importantly,
is the court relying on dicta from the cases which it cites?
The court in Lanza v. Drexel & Co. based its decision on both
legislative intent and case law precedent. The state of the common
law in 1933 regarding director liablility was the starting point for the
majority. The court stated that, at common law, directors did not
have a duty to convey material, adverse information to purchasers
of stock. 172
 It is not argued that the Lanza court incorrectly stated
the common law rule, but it seems clear that insufficient weight was
given by the court to several developments in the common law duty
of directors which were in progress in the early 1930's.
To illustrate the American common law view of director liabil-
ity, the Lanza court cited Barnes v. Andrews, i 73 an action by a
receiver in bankruptcy against a director of a corporation. When the
corporation went bankrupt, the plaintiff sought to hold Andrews
liable for his inattention and laxity because he had only attended one
director's meeting and had never questioned the solvency or the
operations of the company. Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that
Andrews was liable for the misrepresentations contained in a
fraudulent circular issued by the company. However, the Barnes
court refused to hold him responsible for supervising the preparation
of the circular.
The Lanza court, in considering Barnes, stressed the refusal of
that court to hold a director liable for supervision of a specific detail,
such as a circular,'" but ignored the conclusion of the Barnes court
that a director has a general duty to investigate major developments
"8 1 A. Bromberg, supra note 167, § 2.2(331), at 22.2-.3.
169 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 167, § 8.4(505), at 204.106.
1711 See 1 A. Bromberg, supra note 167, § 2.7, at 55 & n.150.
171 See Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 1016 n.101 (1957).
172
 479 F.2d at 1291.	 •
173 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
174 479 F.2d at 1292.
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within the corporation. 175 In analogizing the facts of the Lanza case
to those of Barnes, it seems that the court incorrectly compared the
acquisition of Victor by BarChris to a specific detail in the day-to-
day operation of the corporation. In fact, the acquisition was more
like the major corporate development which Barnes held the direc-
tor had a duty to investigate.' 76
The Lanza court's discussion of the common law raises as many
questions as it purports to settle. If Congress approved of the com-
mon law status of director liability and securities law operation in
general, what was the purpose of the securities legislation in 1933
and 1934? The court stated that the common law is important in
understanding section 10(b) because it provided the backdrop for the
securities legislation, and because director's duties were still control-
led, for the most part, by state law. 177 It seems inconceivable that
Congress would have enacted this legislation merely to codify,
federalize and thereby make uniform an otherwise satisfactory
common law. It seems far more likely that the securities legislation
was designed to improve upon the common law,' 78 particularly to
supplement the inadaquacies of the common law remedies, thereby
affording greater protection to the public.' 79 The establishment of
the Pecora Committee's° is evidence that Congress believed that the
common law did not eliminate manipulation and deception and was
therefore inadequate. This special Senate committee was constituted
to investigate the possible connection between the abuses of the
public trust by corporate directors and securites dealers and the
economic chaos in the country at the time. 181 Yet the Lanza court
minimized the impact of the Pecora Committee's hearings on the
passage of the securities laws. 182
Even if it were to be assumed, however, that the Securites Act
of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
1934 Act) were a codification of the common law, another question
presents itself. It could hardly have been intended by the Congress
that investors, or others to be protected by the securities legislation,
175 298 F. at 616.
176 Judge Hays, in his dissenting opinion in Lanza, asserted that Coleman did have a
duty to keep himself adequately informed with regard to the activities of the corporation. 479
F.2d at 1318 (dissenting opinion).
177 479 F.2d at 1291.
179 See SEC v, Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc,, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
179 See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
'"" Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), See 479 F.2d at 1290. The Pecora Committee is the name given
to the Senate investigation of stock market practices and personnel involved in the stock
market crash and subsequent economic chaos in the 1929.1934 period,
Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 393 (1934).
192 The common law regulated the securities field prior to 1933. The Pecora Committee
hearings demonstrated how ineffective that regulation was. Yet in the Lanza court's determi-
nation the securities acts were merely a codification of the common law. 479 F.2d at 1299.
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sacrificed possible future protection for a codification of existing law.
Yet, there was an unspoken, underlying assumption in the Lanza
opinion that the common law view prior to the adoption of the
securities laws of 1933 and 1934 was still applicable.' 83
In order to lend weight to its assertion that Congress did not
intend to replace the common law standard of fraud with an abso-
lute liability standard in enacting section 10(b), the Lanza court
made several points based on inferences from other sections of the
1933 and 1934 securities legislation. Sections 11 184 and 12 185 of the
Securities Act of 1933 impose civil liability upon corporate directors
for misleading or inaccurate disclosures of material facts in _the
registration statement or prospectus required under the Act. In
addition, the 1933 Act, as originally enacted, provided for absolute
liability under section 15 186 for "control persons," that is, controlling
shareholders who controlled a director, if the person being control-
led was guilty of a violation of section 11 or 12. After a year in
operation, substantial opposition to this feature developed. 187 As a
result, Congress amended section 15 in 1934, adding the clause
"unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." 188 An analogous
situation exists with regard to section 20 of the 1934 Act, 189 which
imposes liability on control persons for violations, by controlled
persons, of other sections of the Act. It limits liability, as does the
amended section 15, to those control persons not acting in good faith
or who induced the acts of the controlled persons. The Lanza court
reasoned that it is inconsistent to think that Congress intended to
provide for absolute liability under section 10(b) when it was dili-
gently excising it from section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20 of
the 1934 Act.' 9°
This inference, although appealing, is not as helpful as it at first
seems to be. The Lanza case is concerned with the individual actions
or non-actions of Coleman, a director. A statute which relieves a
principal of liability for the intentional torts of his agent could not be
said to create an inference that the legislature intended to relieve the
principal of liability for his own intentional torts.
The Lanza court noted that section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, which imposes liability upon directors for false registration
statements, does not contain an absolute liability provision. 191 It is
183
 Id. at 1291, 1298.
184
 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
188 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
186 Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 15, 48 Stat. 74.
187
 See 479 F.2d at 1298 n.60.
188 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970), amending, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 208,
48 Stat. 908.
188
 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
' 9° 479 F.2d at 1299.
191
 Id. at 1294-96. The precise issue of absolute liability for directors under § 11 was
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ironic that the court devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to
the proposition that legislative intent as to director liability could be
inferred from the history of section 11, since Coleman had already
been held liable under section 11 in an earlier action' 92 involving his
activities on the BarChris board of directors. The court's argument
could help Coleman's position only if it is shown that the standard of
conduct under 10(b) was intended to be lower than that of section
11.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the court made the argument
that the Lanzas could not have brought an action under either
section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act. The court stated that a suit under
section 11 was not possible because the securities were not
registered. 193 It also stated that a suit under section 12 was not
possible because that section requires privity or scienter,'" and
Coleman was found by the district court not to have participated in
the negotiations with the Lanzas or to have known about the mis-
leading statements being given to them.'" The court therefore con-
_
eluded that, in passing section 10(b), Congress could not have in-
tended to impose. upon directors a duty to convey material adverse
information, since the imposition of such a duty would negate the
protection afforded directors under the private offering exemption of
section 11 and the stricter privity standards of section 12.
The Lanzas were defrauded in an exchange of securities,'" and
the court stated that they could not recover against Coleman and
Drexel under section 11, 12, 15 or 20. 197 Thus, it seems clear that if
the plaintiffs were going to recover for fraud, that recovery would
have to be granted under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;' 98 and the
Lanza court would have to interpret 10(b) broadly enough to encom-
pass such a cause of action.
The court suggested that the proper scope of section 10(b) can
be gauged by analyzing the legislative intent at the time of passage
and the common law which was the basis for the legislation.' 99
debated and subsequently discarded by Congress. See H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 26 (1933). The Senate version included absolute liability, but the House was in favor of
allowing a due diligence defense. Id. The House version was adopted and the firsthand
accounts by Landis of the decision to allow a "goodly measure" of reliance seem conclusive.
See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29,
47-48 (1959). However, it is important to note that a significant sentiment did exist to the
effect that absolute liability was the best weapon to combat future securities abuses. Sec S.
Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1933).
The Lama court can fairly be said to have endorsed the House version as the more
reasonable and palatable approach to regulation. See 479 F.2d at 1309.
192
 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
193 479 F.2d at 1298.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1289.
196
 Id. at 1280.
197
 Id. at 1298.
195 See 1 A. Bromberg, supra note 176, § 2.2(332), at 22.4.
199
 479 F.2d at 1291.
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Upon completion of its analysis of the congressional intent and
common law, the court concluded that there was no basis in either
for a duty to convey under 10b-5, 2 0° and moved to a consideration
of whether prior 10b-5 cases had construed the language of the
statute so as to create such a basis.
The Lanza court asserted that a careful reading of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, with its concurring, but limiting, opinions, clearly shows
that the negligence standard is sufficient only in a suit for injunctive
relief. 201 The court went further to say that any doubt as to whether
the issue of scienter was still open in the Second Circuit was ended
by the decision in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 202 Shemtob
was cited by the court as holding that negligence is not sufficient to
impose liability in a suit for damages under 10b-5. 203 However, the
case was an appeal of a dismissal on the basis that the plaintiffs
failed to allege any more than a breach of contract, and is more
correctly characterized by the dissent in Lanza: "[W]hile stating in
dictum that 'it is insufficient to allege mere negligence,' [the Shemtob
court] actually held only that the complaint failed to state a claim for
relief under 10b-5 on the ground that the suit was a 'garden-variety
customer's suit against a broker for breach of contract . . ,,204
Much of the confusion in the 10b-5 area results from the use of
dicta to substantiate a particular point of view. 2 ° 8 Most language in
the cases indicating the sufficiency of negligence for a cause of action
under 10b-5 has been dictum in fact situations in which the - defen-
dants were guilty of conduct amounting to scienter. 206 The Lanza
court acknowledged this fact, 207 but unfortunately seems to be
guilty of the same type of dicta search to establish that negligence is
not sufficient for 10-5 liability. In Levine v. SEC, 208 the revocation
of a broker-dealer's registration was affirmed because the court
found that the broker-dealer had actual knowledge of misrepresenta-
tions to purchasers of stock. Such actual knowledge amounted to
scienter. The Lanza court, however, cited only the following section
of the Levine court's decision:
Of course, absent actual knowledge or warning signals, a
broker-dealer should not be under a duty to retain his own
auditor to re-examine the books of every company, the
stock of which he may offer for sale, even accepting the
doubtful hypotheses that such permission would be
granted. 2 °9
200 Id. at 1291, 1299.
2°' Id. at 1304.
202
 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971). See 479 F.2d at 1304.
2 ° 3
 479 F.2d at 1304-05.
204 Id. at 1319 (dissenting opinion).
2 °5 See text at notes 77-81 supra.
2 °6
 Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 562, 590 (1972).
207 479 F.2d at 1305.
201 436 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1971).
209 Id. at 90, quoted in Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1302.
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In citing SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc., 210 the Lanza
court stated that the court had specifically declined to consider
whether liability could occur if the defendants neither knew nor had
reason to know. 2 " However, this was a case which involved a
denial of an injunction and the parties were guilty of more than
mere negligence.
The court also cited a case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Wessel
v. Buhler. 212 In Wessel, the plaintiffs claimed that an independent
accountant who audited a corporation engaging in a stock issue was
under a duty to disclose any adverse financial information which he
discovered. The Ninth Circuit rejected this "extraordinary theory of
Rule 10b-5 liability." 2 ' 3 The Lanza court used this case as an illus-
tration "of the distance we would travel were we to agree with
plaintiffs that Rule 10b-5 imposes upon directors a duty to
co nvey."214 However, it is not clear how the exclusion of a private
accountant from 10b-5 coverage bears on the question whether a
director in Coleman's position had a duty to convey information.
Vagueness as to coverage on the fringes of a statute is not exculpa-
tory for a party whose conduct was more clearly within the required
prohibition. 215
The Lanza court concluded that a survey of the case law de-
velopment of 10b-5, dicta to the contrary notwithstanding, indicates
that an intent to defraud or a willful and reckless disregard for the
truth is required in a private right of action for damages underjob- 5 . 216
This intensive analysis by the Lanza court of the legislative
history and the case law development was presented in the initial
sections of the majority opinion. It seems clear that the court was
attempting to lay to rest the controversy which has surrounded the
debate over congressional intent and the case law precedent for a
particular purpose. The court was attempting to demonstrate that
its opinion does not represent a sudden break with history and
precedent, but rather that both solidly underpin the court's decision
to require some form of scienter. The establishment of this under-
pinning of common law and legislative intent permitted the court to
consider the fourth and final step in approaching the 1Ob-5 case-
-that is, consideration of the policies and .purposes behind the rule
and their interaction with the realities of the business world. 217
While the policies of public interest and investor protection,
specifically set forth in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 218 appear far
2111
 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
211 479 F.2d at 1302.
212
 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971), cited in Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1300.
213 437 F.2d at 283.
2" 479 F.2d at 1300.
2 " Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 610 (1973).
216
 479 F.2d at 1306.
217
	 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 287 (3d Cir. 1972).
' I R 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
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too general to be of any real assistance to the courts, 219 there are
numerous other policy considerations to which a court may direct its
attention.
D. Public Policy Arguments Employed by the Court
The first consideration is that the injury to the plaintiff is the
same regardless of whether the defendant's conduct was negligent or
willful. 220 A court may also consider the effect of its decision on the
flow of information to the public regarding securities, giving atten-
tion to the quality as well as the quantity of such information. 22 '
The more difficult it is to establish liability, the more information
investors will have. However, with a freer flow of information,
quality and accuracy may suffer. 222. The easier it is to establish
liability, the more careful will be the representations, and presuma-
bly, the higher the quality of information released. 223 However, the
rule may then become, "when in doubt, say as little as possible. "224
A court may consider whether the expectation of full disclosure
in an exchange transaction is warranted, given common business
practice. 225 Corporations continuously issue news releases, proxy
statements, financial and numerous other reports, the subject matter
of which is generally quite complex. Because of this complexity,
these documents sometimes contain mistakes. The predication of
liability on such error, even though the information was issued in
good faith, would make these corporations insurers. Such a policy
could controvert the disclosure policies of the securities laws by
making corporations hesitant to issue any information. 226
Deterrence is one of the common policies which the courts have
considered in fashioning 10b-5 liabilitSr. 227 Here a court is faced with
the problem of how much deterrence can actually be accomplished
by changes in the scienter requirement. Another policy which a
court might consider is the promotion of uniform enforcement of the
securities laws across the country. 228 A final set of important policies
and values are the pro-business or pro-minority stockholder view-
points of various judges. 229
 In sum, it would not be unfair to say
that the courts of appeals interpret the vague language of section
229 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law § 8.4(508), at 204.114-.115 (1973).
228 Id. at 204.111-.112.
221 Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.LI Rev.
482, 503-04 (1970).
222 id .
223 Id.
224 See Kohn, 458 F.2d at 287.
"3 Id.
" 6 Id.
227 See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 219, § 8.4(508), at 204.114.
228 See id. at 204.115; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 824, 832 n.36 (1965).
229 See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 219, § 8.4(508), at 204.115.
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10(b) and Rule .1013-5 according to their own individual concepts of
corporate responsibility. •
Though it had the opportunity to utilize any of these policy
considerations to support its rationale that directors do not have a
duty to disclose material adverse information, the majority in Lanza
focused primarily on two policy arguments. First, the court reasoned
that independent or outside directors are desirable in corporations,
that the imposition of a low threshold of liability would discourage
individuals of ability and integrity from taking these positions, and
therefore that sound public policy supported its decision not to
impose a standard of negligence. 23 °
The Lanza opinion is open to criticism with regard to this policy
argument. First, while the court placed great emphasis on the value
of independent directors to corporations, it failed to realize that
there are not substantial differences between inside and outside
directors in terms of their duties as directors. 23 ' Secondly, Coleman
was actually aware of many disquieting facts concerning the
financial condition of BarChris, 232 but the court refused to impose
liability on Coleman for nondisclosure. 233 It supported its decision
on the basis that imposition of a duty to disclose would have forced
directors to personally verify information given to them by corporate
officers and independent accountants. 234 On the facts of Lanza, the
court overstated the effect of a disclosure duty on directors. Plain-
tiffs were not actually seeking the imposition upon directors of a
duty to seek out information not available to them, but merely to
convey the information, material to the transaction, which directors
already possessed in their capacity as directors.
The second policy argument which the court used focused on
the "agonizingly subtle" choices which face directors concerning
disclosure. 235
 It is apparent that no purpose would be served by
requiring directors to disclose to the investing public every instance
of dissension or disagreement among members of the board. 236
Directors can reasonably be expected to differ over the general
economic outlook or the corporation's prospects for a good or bad
year. Personality clashes may develop between members of the
board. Disclosure of such facts would be of little or no benefit to
investors, and would have disruptive, if not disastrous, effects on
the corporation. Although, it would be unreasonable to suggest that
a director act as a tabloid for board 'room dissension or as a conduit
for predictions of doom, this can be distinguished from the situation
230 479 F.2d at 1306-07.
231
 D. Vagts, Bask Corporation Law 202 (1973).
232 479 F.2d at 1288-89.
233
 Id, at 1281, 1289.
234
 Id. at 1307.
235
 Id. at 1307-09.
236 Id.
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where the director has knowledge that the corporation is in fact
experiencing serious financial difficulties. In the latter case such
information should be disclosed to investors.
The "agonizingly subtle" choices on disclosure fall between
these two extremes. As the Lanza court notes, grave consequences
can beset the director who makes the wrong choice. 237 Such dis-
closure by a director could subject him to corporate criticism, ad-
versely affect his position on the board, and possibly result in his
dismissal. Most important, as the court notes, is the fact that such
disclosure could misrepresent the actual situation of the
corporation. 238 In such a case the director could be found liable to
both the corporation and the investors.
Yet the Lanza majority overstated the effect of the imposition of
a duty to disclose in the instant case. The court maintained that if
such a duty to disclose were imposed, Coleman would be forced to
hold himself out as "a prophet or a modern Cassandra." 239 How-
ever, it is submitted that even if a negligence standard had been
adopted by the court, Coleman's failure to predict the effects of
dissension among the directors and some temporary business set-
backs on the future of BarChris would not have constituted neglig-
ent conduct on his part.
To the extent that a director has a duty to disclose, this duty
does not include the prediction of the future stability of the corpora-
tion with its attendant consequences should he be wrong. Yet it does
include the duty, particularly in a major corporate transaction, to
investigate facts which potentially constitute Material adverse in 7
formation and to disclose such material adverse information to the
investing public.
There is one remaining policy comment. In the course of its
opinion the court quotes a 1932 law review article to the effect that:
Commercial ethics have improved but it is doubtful
whether during the lifetime of any man now living they
will reach a peak of perfection which requires those who
play the commercial or financial game to lay their cards
face upward on the table. 24 °
Since that article was written, society has seen corporations grow
even larger and more remote, removed from any control by the
stockholders that supposedly own and control them. 241 The public
has also seen illegal campaign contributions, bribes and questionable
corporate policies become not infrequent corporate practices in the
search for profit. In this context, it would have been refreshing, and
237 Id. at 1307-08.
236 Id. at 1308.
239 Id.
240 Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?,
18 Va. L. Rev. 703, 707 (1932), quoted in Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1293 n.43.
2°1 See D. Vagts, supra note 231, at 14.
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perhaps novel, to see the encouragement of honesty and openness on
the part of corporate officials by the Lanza court. It seems clear that
the business world will not sua sponte change its procedures. Yet,
the court took a step backward by encouraging or protecting
Coleman's apparent lack of concern for those dealing with the
corporation.
CONCLUSION
Lanza is a detailed and lengthy opinion which the court hoped
would do more than settle the case at hand. The Second Circuit,
realizing the importance of its pronouncements in the securities field,
has attempted to outline definitively the scope of Rule 10b-5. How-
ever, decisions in this area have long been result-oriented, and in all
likelihood, Lanza will not affect this situation. Despite its attempt to
define more clearly the contours of 10b-5 and to settle the scienter
controversy in private actions, Lanza is not a Miranda 242 decision in
the securities field. If these contours continue to remain vague,
perhaps it is for Congress to mark them with greater clarity.
JAMES R. McGuntx
PETER E. MOLL
242 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
553
